The code poses a security risk due to user memory access in ->release
and had an API that can't be used reliably.  As far as we know it was
never used for real, but if that turns out wrong we'll have to revert
this commit and come up with a band aid.

Jann Horn did look software archives for users of this interface,
and the only users found were example code in sg3_utils, and optional
support in an optional module of the tgt user space iscsi target,
which looks like a proof of concept extension of the /dev/sg
read/write support.

Tony Battersby chimes in that the code is basically unsafe to use in
general:

  The read/write interface on /dev/bsg is impossible to use safely
  because the list of completed commands is per-device (bd->done_list)
  rather than per-fd like it is with /dev/sg.  So if program A and
  program B are both using the write/read interface on the same bsg
  device, then their command responses will get mixed up, and program
  A will read() some command results from program B and vice versa.
  So no, I don't use read/write on /dev/bsg.  From a security standpoint,
  it should definitely be fixed or removed.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>