1. 03 Oct, 2018 1 commit
    • Eric W. Biederman's avatar
      signal: Distinguish between kernel_siginfo and siginfo · ae7795bc
      Eric W. Biederman authored
      Linus recently observed that if we did not worry about the padding
      member in struct siginfo it is only about 48 bytes, and 48 bytes is
      much nicer than 128 bytes for allocating on the stack and copying
      around in the kernel.
      
      The obvious thing of only adding the padding when userspace is
      including siginfo.h won't work as there are sigframe definitions in
      the kernel that embed struct siginfo.
      
      So split siginfo in two; kernel_siginfo and siginfo.  Keeping the
      traditional name for the userspace definition.  While the version that
      is used internally to the kernel and ultimately will not be padded to
      128 bytes is called kernel_siginfo.
      
      The definition of struct kernel_siginfo I have put in include/signal_types.h
      
      A set of buildtime checks has been added to verify the two structures have
      the same field offsets.
      
      To make it easy to verify the change kernel_siginfo retains the same
      size as siginfo.  The reduction in size comes in a following change.
      Signed-off-by: default avatar"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      ae7795bc
  2. 10 Nov, 2017 1 commit
  3. 02 Nov, 2017 1 commit
    • Greg Kroah-Hartman's avatar
      License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license · b2441318
      Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
      Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
      makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
      
      By default all files without license information are under the default
      license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
      
      Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
      SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
      shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
      
      This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
      Philippe Ombredanne.
      
      How this work was done:
      
      Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
      the use cases:
       - file had no licensing information it it.
       - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
       - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
      
      Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
      where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
      had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
      
      The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
      a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
      output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
      tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
      base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
      
      The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
      assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
      results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
      to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
      immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
      
      Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
       - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
       - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
         lines of source
       - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
         lines).
      
      All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
      
      The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
      identifiers to apply.
      
       - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
         considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
         COPYING file license applied.
      
         For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
      
         SPDX license identifier                            # files
         ---------------------------------------------------|-------
         GPL-2.0                                              11139
      
         and resulted in the first patch in this series.
      
         If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
         Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:
      
         SPDX license identifier                            # files
         ---------------------------------------------------|-------
         GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930
      
         and resulted in the second patch in this series.
      
       - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
         of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
         any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
         it (per prior point).  Results summary:
      
         SPDX license identifier                            # files
         ---------------------------------------------------|------
         GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
         GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
         ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
         ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
         LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
         GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
         ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
         LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
         LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
         ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
         ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1
      
         and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
      
       - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
         the concluded license(s).
      
       - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
         license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
         licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
      
       - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
         resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
         which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
      
       - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
         confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
      
       - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
         the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
         in time.
      
      In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
      spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
      source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
      by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
      
      Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
      FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
      disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
      Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
      they are related.
      
      Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
      for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
      files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
      in about 15000 files.
      
      In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
      copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
      correct identifier.
      
      Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
      inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
      version early this week with:
       - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
         license ids and scores
       - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
         files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
       - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
         was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
         SPDX license was correct
      
      This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
      worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
      different types of files to be modified.
      
      These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
      parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
      format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
      based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
      distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
      comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
      generate the patches.
      Reviewed-by: default avatarKate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarPhilippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      b2441318
  4. 14 Sep, 2017 1 commit
    • Michal Hocko's avatar
      mm: treewide: remove GFP_TEMPORARY allocation flag · 0ee931c4
      Michal Hocko authored
      GFP_TEMPORARY was introduced by commit e12ba74d ("Group short-lived
      and reclaimable kernel allocations") along with __GFP_RECLAIMABLE.  It's
      primary motivation was to allow users to tell that an allocation is
      short lived and so the allocator can try to place such allocations close
      together and prevent long term fragmentation.  As much as this sounds
      like a reasonable semantic it becomes much less clear when to use the
      highlevel GFP_TEMPORARY allocation flag.  How long is temporary? Can the
      context holding that memory sleep? Can it take locks? It seems there is
      no good answer for those questions.
      
      The current implementation of GFP_TEMPORARY is basically GFP_KERNEL |
      __GFP_RECLAIMABLE which in itself is tricky because basically none of
      the existing caller provide a way to reclaim the allocated memory.  So
      this is rather misleading and hard to evaluate for any benefits.
      
      I have checked some random users and none of them has added the flag
      with a specific justification.  I suspect most of them just copied from
      other existing users and others just thought it might be a good idea to
      use without any measuring.  This suggests that GFP_TEMPORARY just
      motivates for cargo cult usage without any reasoning.
      
      I believe that our gfp flags are quite complex already and especially
      those with highlevel semantic should be clearly defined to prevent from
      confusion and abuse.  Therefore I propose dropping GFP_TEMPORARY and
      replace all existing users to simply use GFP_KERNEL.  Please note that
      SLAB users with shrinkers will still get __GFP_RECLAIMABLE heuristic and
      so they will be placed properly for memory fragmentation prevention.
      
      I can see reasons we might want some gfp flag to reflect shorterm
      allocations but I propose starting from a clear semantic definition and
      only then add users with proper justification.
      
      This was been brought up before LSF this year by Matthew [1] and it
      turned out that GFP_TEMPORARY really doesn't have a clear semantic.  It
      seems to be a heuristic without any measured advantage for most (if not
      all) its current users.  The follow up discussion has revealed that
      opinions on what might be temporary allocation differ a lot between
      developers.  So rather than trying to tweak existing users into a
      semantic which they haven't expected I propose to simply remove the flag
      and start from scratch if we really need a semantic for short term
      allocations.
      
      [1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170118054945.GD18349@bombadil.infradead.org
      
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix typo]
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
      [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: drm/i915: fix up]
        Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170816144703.378d4f4d@canb.auug.org.au
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170728091904.14627-1-mhocko@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: default avatarMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarStephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
      Acked-by: default avatarMel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
      Acked-by: default avatarVlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
      Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
      Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
      Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      0ee931c4
  5. 02 Mar, 2017 3 commits
  6. 15 Jan, 2017 1 commit
    • Dave Kleikamp's avatar
      coredump: Ensure proper size of sparse core files · 4d22c75d
      Dave Kleikamp authored
      If the last section of a core file ends with an unmapped or zero page,
      the size of the file does not correspond with the last dump_skip() call.
      gdb complains that the file is truncated and can be confusing to users.
      
      After all of the vma sections are written, make sure that the file size
      is no smaller than the current file position.
      
      This problem can be demonstrated with gdb's bigcore testcase on the
      sparc architecture.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
      Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      4d22c75d
  7. 24 Dec, 2016 1 commit
  8. 11 Nov, 2016 1 commit
  9. 08 Jun, 2016 1 commit
  10. 24 May, 2016 1 commit
  11. 12 May, 2016 2 commits
  12. 22 Mar, 2016 1 commit
    • Jann Horn's avatar
      fs/coredump: prevent fsuid=0 dumps into user-controlled directories · 378c6520
      Jann Horn authored
      This commit fixes the following security hole affecting systems where
      all of the following conditions are fulfilled:
      
       - The fs.suid_dumpable sysctl is set to 2.
       - The kernel.core_pattern sysctl's value starts with "/". (Systems
         where kernel.core_pattern starts with "|/" are not affected.)
       - Unprivileged user namespace creation is permitted. (This is
         true on Linux >=3.8, but some distributions disallow it by
         default using a distro patch.)
      
      Under these conditions, if a program executes under secure exec rules,
      causing it to run with the SUID_DUMP_ROOT flag, then unshares its user
      namespace, changes its root directory and crashes, the coredump will be
      written using fsuid=0 and a path derived from kernel.core_pattern - but
      this path is interpreted relative to the root directory of the process,
      allowing the attacker to control where a coredump will be written with
      root privileges.
      
      To fix the security issue, always interpret core_pattern for dumps that
      are written under SUID_DUMP_ROOT relative to the root directory of init.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
      Acked-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
      Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      378c6520
  13. 21 Jan, 2016 1 commit
    • Jann Horn's avatar
      fs/coredump: prevent "" / "." / ".." core path components · ac94b6e3
      Jann Horn authored
      Let %h and %e print empty values as "!", "." as "!" and
      ".." as "!.".
      
      This prevents hostnames and comm values that are empty or consist of one
      or two dots from changing the directory level at which the corefile will
      be stored.
      
      Consider the case where someone decides to sort coredumps by hostname
      with a core pattern like "/cores/%h/core.%e.%p.%t" or so.  In this
      case, hostnames "" and "." would cause the coredump to land directly in
      /cores, which is not what the intent behind the core pattern is, and
      ".." would cause the coredump to land in /.
      
      Yeah, there probably aren't many people who do that, but I still don't
      want this edgecase to be kind of broken.
      
      It seems very unlikely that this caused security issues anywhere, so I'm
      not requesting a stable backport.
      
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak code comment]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
      Acked-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      ac94b6e3
  14. 07 Dec, 2015 1 commit
  15. 07 Nov, 2015 2 commits
  16. 10 Sep, 2015 2 commits
    • Jann Horn's avatar
      fs: Don't dump core if the corefile would become world-readable. · 40f705a7
      Jann Horn authored
      On a filesystem like vfat, all files are created with the same owner
      and mode independent of who created the file. When a vfat filesystem
      is mounted with root as owner of all files and read access for everyone,
      root's processes left world-readable coredumps on it (but other
      users' processes only left empty corefiles when given write access
      because of the uid mismatch).
      
      Given that the old behavior was inconsistent and insecure, I don't see
      a problem with changing it. Now, all processes refuse to dump core unless
      the resulting corefile will only be readable by their owner.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
      Acked-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      40f705a7
    • Jann Horn's avatar
      fs: if a coredump already exists, unlink and recreate with O_EXCL · fbb18169
      Jann Horn authored
      It was possible for an attacking user to trick root (or another user) into
      writing his coredumps into an attacker-readable, pre-existing file using
      rename() or link(), causing the disclosure of secret data from the victim
      process' virtual memory.  Depending on the configuration, it was also
      possible to trick root into overwriting system files with coredumps.  Fix
      that issue by never writing coredumps into existing files.
      
      Requirements for the attack:
       - The attack only applies if the victim's process has a nonzero
         RLIMIT_CORE and is dumpable.
       - The attacker can trick the victim into coredumping into an
         attacker-writable directory D, either because the core_pattern is
         relative and the victim's cwd is attacker-writable or because an
         absolute core_pattern pointing to a world-writable directory is used.
       - The attacker has one of these:
        A: on a system with protected_hardlinks=0:
           execute access to a folder containing a victim-owned,
           attacker-readable file on the same partition as D, and the
           victim-owned file will be deleted before the main part of the attack
           takes place. (In practice, there are lots of files that fulfill
           this condition, e.g. entries in Debian's /var/lib/dpkg/info/.)
           This does not apply to most Linux systems because most distros set
           protected_hardlinks=1.
        B: on a system with protected_hardlinks=1:
           execute access to a folder containing a victim-owned,
           attacker-readable and attacker-writable file on the same partition
           as D, and the victim-owned file will be deleted before the main part
           of the attack takes place.
           (This seems to be uncommon.)
        C: on any system, independent of protected_hardlinks:
           write access to a non-sticky folder containing a victim-owned,
           attacker-readable file on the same partition as D
           (This seems to be uncommon.)
      
      The basic idea is that the attacker moves the victim-owned file to where
      he expects the victim process to dump its core.  The victim process dumps
      its core into the existing file, and the attacker reads the coredump from
      it.
      
      If the attacker can't move the file because he does not have write access
      to the containing directory, he can instead link the file to a directory
      he controls, then wait for the original link to the file to be deleted
      (because the kernel checks that the link count of the corefile is 1).
      
      A less reliable variant that requires D to be non-sticky works with link()
      and does not require deletion of the original link: link() the file into
      D, but then unlink() it directly before the kernel performs the link count
      check.
      
      On systems with protected_hardlinks=0, this variant allows an attacker to
      not only gain information from coredumps, but also clobber existing,
      victim-writable files with coredumps.  (This could theoretically lead to a
      privilege escalation.)
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      fbb18169
  17. 26 Jun, 2015 2 commits
  18. 23 Jun, 2015 1 commit
  19. 12 Apr, 2015 1 commit
  20. 06 Mar, 2015 1 commit
  21. 20 Feb, 2015 1 commit
  22. 14 Oct, 2014 1 commit
    • Oleg Nesterov's avatar
      coredump: add %i/%I in core_pattern to report the tid of the crashed thread · b03023ec
      Oleg Nesterov authored
      format_corename() can only pass the leader's pid to the core handler,
      but there is no simple way to figure out which thread originated the
      coredump.
      
      As Jan explains, this also means that there is no simple way to create
      the backtrace of the crashed process:
      
      As programs are mostly compiled with implicit gcc -fomit-frame-pointer
      one needs program's .eh_frame section (equivalently PT_GNU_EH_FRAME
      segment) or .debug_frame section.  .debug_frame usually is present only
      in separate debug info files usually not even installed on the system.
      While .eh_frame is a part of the executable/library (and it is even
      always mapped for C++ exceptions unwinding) it no longer has to be
      present anywhere on the disk as the program could be upgraded in the
      meantime and the running instance has its executable file already
      unlinked from disk.
      
      One possibility is to echo 0x3f >/proc/*/coredump_filter and dump all
      the file-backed memory including the executable's .eh_frame section.
      But that can create huge core files, for example even due to mmapped
      data files.
      
      Other possibility would be to read .eh_frame from /proc/PID/mem at the
      core_pattern handler time of the core dump.  For the backtrace one needs
      to read the register state first which can be done from core_pattern
      handler:
      
          ptrace(PTRACE_SEIZE, tid, 0, PTRACE_O_TRACEEXIT)
          close(0);    // close pipe fd to resume the sleeping dumper
          waitpid();   // should report EXIT
          PTRACE_GETREGS or other requests
      
      The remaining problem is how to get the 'tid' value of the crashed
      thread.  It could be read from the first NT_PRSTATUS note of the core
      file but that makes the core_pattern handler complicated.
      
      Unfortunately %t is already used so this patch uses %i/%I.
      
      Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (https://github.com/abrt/abrt/wiki/overview)
      is experimenting with this.  It is using the elfutils
      (https://fedorahosted.org/elfutils/) unwinder for generating the
      backtraces.  Apart from not needing matching executables as mentioned
      above, another advantage is that we can get the backtrace without saving
      the core (which might be quite large) to disk.
      
      [mmilata@redhat.com: final paragraph of changelog]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
      Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com>
      Cc: Mark Wielaard <mjw@redhat.com>
      Cc: Martin Milata <mmilata@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      b03023ec
  23. 23 Jul, 2014 1 commit
  24. 19 Apr, 2014 1 commit
    • Eric Dumazet's avatar
      coredump: fix va_list corruption · 404ca80e
      Eric Dumazet authored
      A va_list needs to be copied in case it needs to be used twice.
      
      Thanks to Hugh for debugging this issue, leading to various panics.
      
      Tested:
      
        lpq84:~# echo "|/foobar12345 %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h" >/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern
      
      'produce_core' is simply : main() { *(int *)0 = 1;}
      
        lpq84:~# ./produce_core
        Segmentation fault (core dumped)
        lpq84:~# dmesg | tail -1
        [  614.352947] Core dump to |/foobar12345 lpq84 lpq84 lpq84 lpq84 lpq84 lpq84 lpq84 lpq84 lpq84 lpq84 lpq84 lpq84 lpq84 lpq84 lpq84 lpq84 lpq84 lpq84 lpq84 (null) pipe failed
      
      Notice the last argument was replaced by a NULL (we were lucky enough to
      not crash, but do not try this on your production machine !)
      
      After fix :
      
        lpq83:~# echo "|/foobar12345 %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h %h" >/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern
        lpq83:~# ./produce_core
        Segmentation fault
        lpq83:~# dmesg | tail -1
        [  740.800441] Core dump to |/foobar12345 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 lpq83 pipe failed
      
      Fixes: 5fe9d8ca ("coredump: cn_vprintf() has no reason to call vsnprintf() twice")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Diagnosed-by: default avatarHugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
      Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
      Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.11+
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      404ca80e
  25. 24 Jan, 2014 1 commit
  26. 16 Nov, 2013 2 commits
  27. 09 Nov, 2013 5 commits
  28. 25 Oct, 2013 1 commit
  29. 11 Sep, 2013 1 commit