1. 12 Jan, 2016 1 commit
  2. 16 Nov, 2015 1 commit
  3. 03 Jan, 2014 1 commit
    • Daniel Borkmann's avatar
      netfilter: x_tables: lightweight process control group matching · 82a37132
      Daniel Borkmann authored
      It would be useful e.g. in a server or desktop environment to have
      a facility in the notion of fine-grained "per application" or "per
      application group" firewall policies. Probably, users in the mobile,
      embedded area (e.g. Android based) with different security policy
      requirements for application groups could have great benefit from
      that as well. For example, with a little bit of configuration effort,
      an admin could whitelist well-known applications, and thus block
      otherwise unwanted "hard-to-track" applications like [1] from a
      user's machine. Blocking is just one example, but it is not limited
      to that, meaning we can have much different scenarios/policies that
      netfilter allows us than just blocking, e.g. fine grained settings
      where applications are allowed to connect/send traffic to, application
      traffic marking/conntracking, application-specific packet mangling,
      and so on.
      Implementation of PID-based matching would not be appropriate
      as they frequently change, and child tracking would make that
      even more complex and ugly. Cgroups would be a perfect candidate
      for accomplishing that as they associate a set of tasks with a
      set of parameters for one or more subsystems, in our case the
      netfilter subsystem, which, of course, can be combined with other
      cgroup subsystems into something more complex if needed.
      As mentioned, to overcome this constraint, such processes could
      be placed into one or multiple cgroups where different fine-grained
      rules can be defined depending on the application scenario, while
      e.g. everything else that is not part of that could be dropped (or
      vice versa), thus making life harder for unwanted processes to
      communicate to the outside world. So, we make use of cgroups here
      to track jobs and limit their resources in terms of iptables
      policies; in other words, limiting, tracking, etc what they are
      allowed to communicate.
      In our case we're working on outgoing traffic based on which local
      socket that originated from. Also, one doesn't even need to have
      an a-prio knowledge of the application internals regarding their
      particular use of ports or protocols. Matching is *extremly*
      lightweight as we just test for the sk_classid marker of sockets,
      originating from net_cls. net_cls and netfilter do not contradict
      each other; in fact, each construct can live as standalone or they
      can be used in combination with each other, which is perfectly fine,
      plus it serves Tejun's requirement to not introduce a new cgroups
      subsystem. Through this, we result in a very minimal and efficient
      module, and don't add anything except netfilter code.
      One possible, minimal usage example (many other iptables options
      can be applied obviously):
       1) Configuring cgroups if not already done, e.g.:
        mkdir /sys/fs/cgroup/net_cls
        mount -t cgroup -o net_cls net_cls /sys/fs/cgroup/net_cls
        mkdir /sys/fs/cgroup/net_cls/0
        echo 1 > /sys/fs/cgroup/net_cls/0/net_cls.classid
        (resp. a real flow handle id for tc)
       2) Configuring netfilter (iptables-nftables), e.g.:
        iptables -A OUTPUT -m cgroup ! --cgroup 1 -j DROP
       3) Running applications, e.g.:
        ping  <pid:1799>
        echo 1799 > /sys/fs/cgroup/net_cls/0/tasks
        64 bytes from icmp_seq=44 ttl=49 time=11.9 ms
        ping  <pid:1804>
        ping: sendmsg: Operation not permitted
        echo 1804 > /sys/fs/cgroup/net_cls/0/tasks
        64 bytes from icmp_seq=89 ttl=56 time=19.0 ms
      Of course, real-world deployments would make use of cgroups user
      space toolsuite, or own custom policy daemons dynamically moving
      applications from/to various cgroups.
        [1] http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-europe-06/bh-eu-06-biondi/bh-eu-06-biondi-up.pdfSigned-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
      Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
      Cc: cgroups@vger.kernel.org
      Acked-by: default avatarLi Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
  4. 08 Apr, 2013 1 commit