Commit de8cb458 authored by David Howells's avatar David Howells Committed by Ingo Molnar

efi: Get and store the secure boot status

Get the firmware's secure-boot status in the kernel boot wrapper and stash
it somewhere that the main kernel image can find.

The efi_get_secureboot() function is extracted from the ARM stub and (a)
generalised so that it can be called from x86 and (b) made to use
efi_call_runtime() so that it can be run in mixed-mode.

For x86, it is stored in boot_params and can be overridden by the boot
loader or kexec.  This allows secure-boot mode to be passed on to a new
kernel.
Suggested-by: default avatarLukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1486380166-31868-5-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
[ Small readability edits. ]
Signed-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
parent e58910cd
......@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ Offset Proto Name Meaning
1E9/001 ALL eddbuf_entries Number of entries in eddbuf (below)
1EA/001 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries Number of entries in edd_mbr_sig_buffer
(below)
1EB/001 ALL kbd_status Numlock is enabled
1EC/001 ALL secure_boot Secure boot is enabled in the firmware
1EF/001 ALL sentinel Used to detect broken bootloaders
290/040 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buffer EDD MBR signatures
2D0/A00 ALL e820_map E820 memory map table
......
......@@ -988,6 +988,13 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(struct efi_config *c,
else
setup_boot_services32(efi_early);
/*
* If the boot loader gave us a value for secure_boot then we use that,
* otherwise we ask the BIOS.
*/
if (boot_params->secure_boot == efi_secureboot_mode_unset)
boot_params->secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot(sys_table);
setup_graphics(boot_params);
setup_efi_pci(boot_params);
......
......@@ -135,7 +135,8 @@ struct boot_params {
__u8 eddbuf_entries; /* 0x1e9 */
__u8 edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries; /* 0x1ea */
__u8 kbd_status; /* 0x1eb */
__u8 _pad5[3]; /* 0x1ec */
__u8 secure_boot; /* 0x1ec */
__u8 _pad5[2]; /* 0x1ed */
/*
* The sentinel is set to a nonzero value (0xff) in header.S.
*
......
......@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ void common(void) {
BLANK();
OFFSET(BP_scratch, boot_params, scratch);
OFFSET(BP_secure_boot, boot_params, secure_boot);
OFFSET(BP_loadflags, boot_params, hdr.loadflags);
OFFSET(BP_hardware_subarch, boot_params, hdr.hardware_subarch);
OFFSET(BP_version, boot_params, hdr.version);
......
......@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD := y
# Prevents link failures: __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is not linked in.
KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n
lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o
lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o
# include the stub's generic dependencies from lib/ when building for ARM/arm64
arm-deps := fdt_rw.c fdt_ro.c fdt_wip.c fdt.c fdt_empty_tree.c fdt_sw.c sort.c
......
......@@ -20,52 +20,6 @@
bool __nokaslr;
static int efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
{
static efi_char16_t const sb_var_name[] = {
'S', 'e', 'c', 'u', 'r', 'e', 'B', 'o', 'o', 't', 0 };
static efi_char16_t const sm_var_name[] = {
'S', 'e', 't', 'u', 'p', 'M', 'o', 'd', 'e', 0 };
efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
efi_get_variable_t *f_getvar = sys_table_arg->runtime->get_variable;
u8 val;
unsigned long size = sizeof(val);
efi_status_t status;
status = f_getvar((efi_char16_t *)sb_var_name, (efi_guid_t *)&var_guid,
NULL, &size, &val);
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
goto out_efi_err;
if (val == 0)
return 0;
status = f_getvar((efi_char16_t *)sm_var_name, (efi_guid_t *)&var_guid,
NULL, &size, &val);
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
goto out_efi_err;
if (val == 1)
return 0;
return 1;
out_efi_err:
switch (status) {
case EFI_NOT_FOUND:
return 0;
case EFI_DEVICE_ERROR:
return -EIO;
case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
return -EACCES;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
efi_status_t efi_open_volume(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
void *__image, void **__fh)
{
......@@ -157,7 +111,7 @@ unsigned long efi_entry(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *sys_table,
efi_guid_t loaded_image_proto = LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL_GUID;
unsigned long reserve_addr = 0;
unsigned long reserve_size = 0;
int secure_boot = 0;
enum efi_secureboot_mode secure_boot;
struct screen_info *si;
/* Check if we were booted by the EFI firmware */
......@@ -227,19 +181,14 @@ unsigned long efi_entry(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *sys_table,
pr_efi_err(sys_table, "Failed to parse EFI cmdline options\n");
secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot(sys_table);
if (secure_boot > 0)
pr_efi(sys_table, "UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
if (secure_boot < 0) {
pr_efi_err(sys_table,
"could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
}
/*
* Unauthenticated device tree data is a security hazard, so
* ignore 'dtb=' unless UEFI Secure Boot is disabled.
* Unauthenticated device tree data is a security hazard, so ignore
* 'dtb=' unless UEFI Secure Boot is disabled. We assume that secure
* boot is enabled if we can't determine its state.
*/
if (secure_boot != 0 && strstr(cmdline_ptr, "dtb=")) {
if (secure_boot != efi_secureboot_mode_disabled &&
strstr(cmdline_ptr, "dtb=")) {
pr_efi(sys_table, "Ignoring DTB from command line.\n");
} else {
status = handle_cmdline_files(sys_table, image, cmdline_ptr,
......
/*
* Secure boot handling.
*
* Copyright (C) 2013,2014 Linaro Limited
* Roy Franz <roy.franz@linaro.org
* Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc.
* Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
*
* This file is part of the Linux kernel, and is made available under the
* terms of the GNU General Public License version 2.
*/
#include <linux/efi.h>
#include <asm/efi.h>
/* BIOS variables */
static const efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
static const efi_char16_t const efi_SecureBoot_name[] = {
'S', 'e', 'c', 'u', 'r', 'e', 'B', 'o', 'o', 't', 0
};
static const efi_char16_t const efi_SetupMode_name[] = {
'S', 'e', 't', 'u', 'p', 'M', 'o', 'd', 'e', 0
};
#define get_efi_var(name, vendor, ...) \
efi_call_runtime(get_variable, \
(efi_char16_t *)(name), (efi_guid_t *)(vendor), \
__VA_ARGS__);
/*
* Determine whether we're in secure boot mode.
*/
enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
{
u8 secboot, setupmode;
unsigned long size;
efi_status_t status;
size = sizeof(secboot);
status = get_efi_var(efi_SecureBoot_name, &efi_variable_guid,
NULL, &size, &secboot);
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
goto out_efi_err;
size = sizeof(setupmode);
status = get_efi_var(efi_SetupMode_name, &efi_variable_guid,
NULL, &size, &setupmode);
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
goto out_efi_err;
if (secboot == 0 || setupmode == 1)
return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
pr_efi(sys_table_arg, "UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
return efi_secureboot_mode_enabled;
out_efi_err:
pr_efi_err(sys_table_arg, "Could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
}
......@@ -1480,6 +1480,14 @@ efi_status_t efi_setup_gop(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
bool efi_runtime_disabled(void);
extern void efi_call_virt_check_flags(unsigned long flags, const char *call);
enum efi_secureboot_mode {
efi_secureboot_mode_unset,
efi_secureboot_mode_unknown,
efi_secureboot_mode_disabled,
efi_secureboot_mode_enabled,
};
enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table);
/*
* Arch code can implement the following three template macros, avoiding
* reptition for the void/non-void return cases of {__,}efi_call_virt():
......
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