1. 29 Apr, 2013 1 commit
  2. 23 Feb, 2013 1 commit
  3. 29 Nov, 2012 1 commit
  4. 05 Oct, 2012 1 commit
  5. 31 May, 2012 1 commit
  6. 21 Apr, 2012 1 commit
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      VM: add "vm_mmap()" helper function · 6be5ceb0
      Linus Torvalds authored
      This continues the theme started with vm_brk() and vm_munmap():
      vm_mmap() does the same thing as do_mmap(), but additionally does the
      required VM locking.
      This uninlines (and rewrites it to be clearer) do_mmap(), which sadly
      duplicates it in mm/mmap.c and mm/nommu.c.  But that way we don't have
      to export our internal do_mmap_pgoff() function.
      Some day we hopefully don't have to export do_mmap() either, if all
      modular users can become the simpler vm_mmap() instead.  We're actually
      very close to that already, with the notable exception of the (broken)
      use in i810, and a couple of stragglers in binfmt_elf.
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
  7. 28 Mar, 2012 1 commit
  8. 21 Mar, 2012 2 commits
  9. 29 Feb, 2012 1 commit
  10. 03 May, 2011 1 commit
  11. 31 Mar, 2011 1 commit
  12. 29 Jun, 2010 1 commit
    • Mike Frysinger's avatar
      flat: tweak default stack alignment · 2952095c
      Mike Frysinger authored
      The recent commit 1f0ce8b3 ("mm: Move ARCH_SLAB_MINALIGN and
      ARCH_KMALLOC_MINALIGN to <linux/slab_def.h>") which moved the
      ARCH_SLAB_MINALIGN default into the global header inadvertently broke FLAT
      for a bunch of systems.  Blackfin systems now fail on any FLAT exec with:
      Unable to read code+data+bss, errno 14 When your /init is a FLAT binary,
      obviously this can be annoying ;).
      This stems from the alignment usage in the FLAT loader.  The behavior
      before was that FLAT would default to ARCH_SLAB_MINALIGN only if it was
      defined, and this was only defined by arches when they wanted a larger
      alignment value.  Otherwise it'd default to pointer alignment.  Arguably,
      this is kind of hokey that the FLAT is semi-abusing defines it shouldn't.
      So let's merge the two alignment requirements so the floor is never 0.
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarMike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
      Cc: David McCullough <davidm@snapgear.com>
      Cc: Greg Ungerer <gerg@uclinux.org>
      Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
      Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
      Cc: Hirokazu Takata <takata@linux-m32r.org>
      Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
      Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Cc: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
      Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
  13. 04 Jun, 2010 2 commits
  14. 21 Apr, 2010 1 commit
  15. 06 Mar, 2010 1 commit
  16. 29 Jan, 2010 1 commit
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Split 'flush_old_exec' into two functions · 221af7f8
      Linus Torvalds authored
      'flush_old_exec()' is the point of no return when doing an execve(), and
      it is pretty badly misnamed.  It doesn't just flush the old executable
      environment, it also starts up the new one.
      Which is very inconvenient for things like setting up the new
      personality, because we want the new personality to affect the starting
      of the new environment, but at the same time we do _not_ want the new
      personality to take effect if flushing the old one fails.
      As a result, the x86-64 '32-bit' personality is actually done using this
      insane "I'm going to change the ABI, but I haven't done it yet" bit
      (TIF_ABI_PENDING), with SET_PERSONALITY() not actually setting the
      personality, but just the "pending" bit, so that "flush_thread()" can do
      the actual personality magic.
      This patch in no way changes any of that insanity, but it does split the
      'flush_old_exec()' function up into a preparatory part that can fail
      (still called flush_old_exec()), and a new part that will actually set
      up the new exec environment (setup_new_exec()).  All callers are changed
      to trivially comply with the new world order.
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: stable@kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
  17. 17 Dec, 2009 1 commit
  18. 24 Sep, 2009 1 commit
  19. 07 Aug, 2009 1 commit
  20. 29 May, 2009 1 commit
    • Oskar Schirmer's avatar
      flat: fix data sections alignment · c3dc5bec
      Oskar Schirmer authored
      The flat loader uses an architecture's flat_stack_align() to align the
      stack but assumes word-alignment is enough for the data sections.
      However, on the Xtensa S6000 we have registers up to 128bit width
      which can be used from userspace and therefor need userspace stack and
      data-section alignment of at least this size.
      This patch drops flat_stack_align() and uses the same alignment that
      is required for slab caches, ARCH_SLAB_MINALIGN, or wordsize if it's
      not defined by the architecture.
      It also fixes m32r which was obviously kaput, aligning an
      uninitialized stack entry instead of the stack pointer.
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarOskar Schirmer <os@emlix.com>
      Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk>
      Cc: Bryan Wu <cooloney@kernel.org>
      Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
      Acked-by: 's avatarPaul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
      Cc: Greg Ungerer <gerg@uclinux.org>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarJohannes Weiner <jw@emlix.com>
      Acked-by: 's avatarMike Frysinger <vapier.adi@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
  21. 08 Jan, 2009 1 commit
  22. 13 Nov, 2008 1 commit
    • David Howells's avatar
      CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials · a6f76f23
      David Howells authored
      Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set
      up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point
      of no return.
      This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
      This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
       (1) execve().
           The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part,
           replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred).  This means that
           all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point
           of no return with no possibility of failure.
           I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with:
           but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1
           (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd
           be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()).
           The following sequence of events now happens:
           (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is
           	 locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of
           	 creds that we make.
           (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current
           	 task's credentials and prepare it.  This copy is then assigned to
        	 This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free()
           	 unnecessary, and so they've been removed.
           (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately
           	 after (a) rather than later on in the code.  The result is stored in
           	 bprm->unsafe for future reference.
           (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times.
           	 (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds
           	     attached to bprm->cred.  Personality bit clearance is recorded,
           	     but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet
               (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds().  This should
      	     calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred.
      	     This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of
      	     security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed).
      	     Anything that might fail must be done at this point.
               (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1.
      	     bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security
      	     calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes.  This allows SELinux
      	     in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and
      	     not on the interpreter.
           (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution.  This
           	 performs the following steps with regard to credentials:
      	 (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that
      	     may not be covered by commit_creds().
               (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from
           (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the
           	 new credentials.  This performs the following steps with regard to
               (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security
                   requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that
                   must be done before the credentials are changed.
      	     This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and
      	     security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed.
      	     This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail
      	     must have been done in (c.ii).
               (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single
                   assignment (more or less).  Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable
                   should be part of struct creds.
      	 (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing
      	     PTRACE_ATTACH to take place.
               (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding
                   are now immutable.
               (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security
                   alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed.
                   SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers.
           (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds()
           	 to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock
           	 cred_replace_mutex.  No changes to the credentials will have been
       (2) LSM interface.
           A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
           (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security()
           (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security()
           	 Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those.
           (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
           (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds()
           	 Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(),
           	 security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds().
           (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security()
           	 Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds().
           (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds()
           	 New.  The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up
           	 as appropriate.  bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the
           	 second and subsequent calls.
           (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds()
           (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds()
           	 New.  Apply the security effects of the new credentials.  This
           	 includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux.  This function may not
           	 fail.  When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied
           	 to the process; when the latter is called, they have.
       	 The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not.
       (3) SELinux.
           SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
           interface changes mentioned above:
           (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using
           	 the credentials-under-construction approach.
           (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on
           	 to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open().
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: 's avatarJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      Acked-by: 's avatarSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
  23. 16 Oct, 2008 1 commit
  24. 11 Aug, 2008 1 commit
  25. 26 Jul, 2008 1 commit
    • Roland McGrath's avatar
      tracehook: exec · 6341c393
      Roland McGrath authored
      This moves all the ptrace hooks related to exec into tracehook.h inlines.
      This also lifts the calls for tracing out of the binfmt load_binary hooks
      into search_binary_handler() after it calls into the binfmt module.  This
      change has no effect, since all the binfmt modules' load_binary functions
      did the call at the end on success, and now search_binary_handler() does
      it immediately after return if successful.  We consolidate the repeated
      code, and binfmt modules no longer need to import ptrace_notify().
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarRoland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
      Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
      Reviewed-by: 's avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
  26. 06 Jun, 2008 1 commit
  27. 29 Apr, 2008 2 commits
    • Matt Helsley's avatar
      procfs task exe symlink · 925d1c40
      Matt Helsley authored
      The kernel implements readlink of /proc/pid/exe by getting the file from
      the first executable VMA.  Then the path to the file is reconstructed and
      reported as the result.
      Because of the VMA walk the code is slightly different on nommu systems.
      This patch avoids separate /proc/pid/exe code on nommu systems.  Instead of
      walking the VMAs to find the first executable file-backed VMA we store a
      reference to the exec'd file in the mm_struct.
      That reference would prevent the filesystem holding the executable file
      from being unmounted even after unmapping the VMAs.  So we track the number
      of VM_EXECUTABLE VMAs and drop the new reference when the last one is
      unmapped.  This avoids pinning the mounted filesystem.
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: improve comments]
      [yamamoto@valinux.co.jp: fix dup_mmap]
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarMatt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com>
      Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
      Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Cc:"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
      Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarYAMAMOTO Takashi <yamamoto@valinux.co.jp>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
    • Adrian Bunk's avatar
      make BINFMT_FLAT a bool · 3202e181
      Adrian Bunk authored
      I have not yet seen anyone saying he has a reasonable use case for using
      BINFMT_FLAT modular on his embedded device.
      Considering that fs/binfmt_flat.c even lacks a MODULE_LICENSE() I really doubt
      there is any, and this patch therefore makes BINFMT_FLAT a bool.
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarAdrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
      Acked-by: 's avatarBryan Wu <cooloney.lkml@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
  28. 15 Feb, 2008 1 commit
  29. 08 Feb, 2008 1 commit
  30. 17 Oct, 2007 2 commits
    • Andrew Morton's avatar
      binfmt_flat: warning fixes · 0e647c04
      Andrew Morton authored
      Fix this lot:
      fs/binfmt_flat.c: In function `decompress_exec':
      fs/binfmt_flat.c:293: warning: label `out' defined but not used
      fs/binfmt_flat.c: In function `load_flat_file':
      fs/binfmt_flat.c:462: warning: unsigned int format, long int arg (arg 3)
      fs/binfmt_flat.c:462: warning: unsigned int format, long int arg (arg 4)
      fs/binfmt_flat.c:518: warning: comparison of distinct pointer types lacks a cast
      fs/binfmt_flat.c:549: warning: passing arg 1 of `ksize' makes pointer from integer without a cast
      fs/binfmt_flat.c:601: warning: passing arg 1 of `ksize' makes pointer from integer without a cast
      fs/binfmt_flat.c: In function `load_flat_binary':
      fs/binfmt_flat.c:116: warning: 'dummy' might be used uninitialized in this function
      Acked-by: 's avatarGreg Ungerer <gerg@uclinux.org>
      Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
    • Neil Horman's avatar
      core_pattern: ignore RLIMIT_CORE if core_pattern is a pipe · 7dc0b22e
      Neil Horman authored
      For some time /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern has been able to set its output
      destination as a pipe, allowing a user space helper to receive and
      intellegently process a core.  This infrastructure however has some
      shortcommings which can be enhanced.  Specifically:
      1) The coredump code in the kernel should ignore RLIMIT_CORE limitation
         when core_pattern is a pipe, since file system resources are not being
         consumed in this case, unless the user application wishes to save the core,
         at which point the app is restricted by usual file system limits and
      2) The core_pattern code should be able to parse and pass options to the
         user space helper as an argv array.  The real core limit of the uid of the
         crashing proces should also be passable to the user space helper (since it
         is overridden to zero when called).
      3) Some miscellaneous bugs need to be cleaned up (specifically the
         recognition of a recursive core dump, should the user mode helper itself
         crash.  Also, the core dump code in the kernel should not wait for the user
         mode helper to exit, since the same context is responsible for writing to
         the pipe, and a read of the pipe by the user mode helper will result in a
      This patch:
      Remove the check of RLIMIT_CORE if core_pattern is a pipe.  In the event that
      core_pattern is a pipe, the entire core will be fed to the user mode helper.
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
      Cc: <martin.pitt@ubuntu.com>
      Cc: <wwoods@redhat.com>
      Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: 's avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
  31. 03 Oct, 2007 2 commits
  32. 09 Jun, 2007 1 commit
  33. 09 Feb, 2007 1 commit
  34. 08 Dec, 2006 1 commit
  35. 30 Jun, 2006 1 commit