1. 09 May, 2017 1 commit
  2. 26 Apr, 2017 1 commit
  3. 28 Mar, 2017 1 commit
  4. 24 Mar, 2017 1 commit
  5. 25 Feb, 2017 3 commits
  6. 24 Feb, 2017 1 commit
  7. 14 Feb, 2017 2 commits
  8. 03 Feb, 2017 1 commit
    • Jiri Pirko's avatar
      lib: Introduce priority array area manager · 44091d29
      Jiri Pirko authored
      This introduces a infrastructure for management of linear priority
      areas. Priority order in an array matters, however order of items inside
      a priority group does not matter.
      As an initial implementation, L-sort algorithm is used. It is quite
      trivial. More advanced algorithm called P-sort will be introduced as a
      follow-up. The infrastructure is prepared for other algos.
      Alongside this, a testing module is introduced as well.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
  9. 02 Feb, 2017 1 commit
    • Jason A. Donenfeld's avatar
      ext4: move halfmd4 into hash.c directly · 1c83a9aa
      Jason A. Donenfeld authored
      The "half md4" transform should not be used by any new code. And
      fortunately, it's only used now by ext4. Since ext4 supports several
      hashing methods, at some point it might be desirable to move to
      something like SipHash. As an intermediate step, remove half md4 from
      cryptohash.h and lib, and make it just a local function in ext4's
      hash.c. There's precedent for doing this; the other function ext can use
      for its hashes -- TEA -- is also implemented in the same place. Also, by
      being a local function, this might allow gcc to perform some additional
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarAndreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
      Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
  10. 24 Jan, 2017 2 commits
  11. 09 Jan, 2017 1 commit
    • Jason A. Donenfeld's avatar
      siphash: add cryptographically secure PRF · 2c956a60
      Jason A. Donenfeld authored
      SipHash is a 64-bit keyed hash function that is actually a
      cryptographically secure PRF, like HMAC. Except SipHash is super fast,
      and is meant to be used as a hashtable keyed lookup function, or as a
      general PRF for short input use cases, such as sequence numbers or RNG
      For the first usage:
      There are a variety of attacks known as "hashtable poisoning" in which an
      attacker forms some data such that the hash of that data will be the
      same, and then preceeds to fill up all entries of a hashbucket. This is
      a realistic and well-known denial-of-service vector. Currently
      hashtables use jhash, which is fast but not secure, and some kind of
      rotating key scheme (or none at all, which isn't good). SipHash is meant
      as a replacement for jhash in these cases.
      There are a modicum of places in the kernel that are vulnerable to
      hashtable poisoning attacks, either via userspace vectors or network
      vectors, and there's not a reliable mechanism inside the kernel at the
      moment to fix it. The first step toward fixing these issues is actually
      getting a secure primitive into the kernel for developers to use. Then
      we can, bit by bit, port things over to it as deemed appropriate.
      While SipHash is extremely fast for a cryptographically secure function,
      it is likely a bit slower than the insecure jhash, and so replacements
      will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis based on whether or not the
      difference in speed is negligible and whether or not the current jhash usage
      poses a real security risk.
      For the second usage:
      A few places in the kernel are using MD5 or SHA1 for creating secure
      sequence numbers, syn cookies, port numbers, or fast random numbers.
      SipHash is a faster and more fitting, and more secure replacement for MD5
      in those situations. Replacing MD5 and SHA1 with SipHash for these uses is
      obvious and straight-forward, and so is submitted along with this patch
      series. There shouldn't be much of a debate over its efficacy.
      Dozens of languages are already using this internally for their hash
      tables and PRFs. Some of the BSDs already use this in their kernels.
      SipHash is a widely known high-speed solution to a widely known set of
      problems, and it's time we catch-up.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarJean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@gmail.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
  12. 27 Dec, 2016 1 commit
  13. 25 Dec, 2016 1 commit
  14. 11 Oct, 2016 1 commit
  15. 21 Sep, 2016 1 commit
  16. 17 Sep, 2016 1 commit
  17. 30 Aug, 2016 1 commit
    • Josh Poimboeuf's avatar
      mm/usercopy: get rid of CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS · 0d025d27
      Josh Poimboeuf authored
      There are three usercopy warnings which are currently being silenced for
      gcc 4.6 and newer:
      1) "copy_from_user() buffer size is too small" compile warning/error
         This is a static warning which happens when object size and copy size
         are both const, and copy size > object size.  I didn't see any false
         positives for this one.  So the function warning attribute seems to
         be working fine here.
         Note this scenario is always a bug and so I think it should be
         changed to *always* be an error, regardless of
      2) "copy_from_user() buffer size is not provably correct" compile warning
         This is another static warning which happens when I enable
         __compiletime_object_size() for new compilers (and
         CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS).  It happens when object size
         is const, but copy size is *not*.  In this case there's no way to
         compare the two at build time, so it gives the warning.  (Note the
         warning is a byproduct of the fact that gcc has no way of knowing
         whether the overflow function will be called, so the call isn't dead
         code and the warning attribute is activated.)
         So this warning seems to only indicate "this is an unusual pattern,
         maybe you should check it out" rather than "this is a bug".
         I get 102(!) of these warnings with allyesconfig and the
         __compiletime_object_size() gcc check removed.  I don't know if there
         are any real bugs hiding in there, but from looking at a small
         sample, I didn't see any.  According to Kees, it does sometimes find
         real bugs.  But the false positive rate seems high.
      3) "Buffer overflow detected" runtime warning
         This is a runtime warning where object size is const, and copy size >
         object size.
      All three warnings (both static and runtime) were completely disabled
      for gcc 4.6 with the following commit:
        2fb0815c ("gcc4: disable __compiletime_object_size for GCC 4.6+")
      That commit mistakenly assumed that the false positives were caused by a
      gcc bug in __compiletime_object_size().  But in fact,
      __compiletime_object_size() seems to be working fine.  The false
      positives were instead triggered by #2 above.  (Though I don't have an
      explanation for why the warnings supposedly only started showing up in
      gcc 4.6.)
      So remove warning #2 to get rid of all the false positives, and re-enable
      warnings #1 and #3 by reverting the above commit.
      Furthermore, since #1 is a real bug which is detected at compile time,
      upgrade it to always be an error.
      Having done all that, CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS is no longer
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
      Cc: Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com>
      Cc: Nilay Vaish <nilayvaish@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
  18. 03 Jul, 2016 1 commit
  19. 08 Jun, 2016 1 commit
  20. 30 May, 2016 1 commit
  21. 28 May, 2016 1 commit
    • George Spelvin's avatar
      <linux/hash.h>: Add support for architecture-specific functions · 468a9428
      George Spelvin authored
      This is just the infrastructure; there are no users yet.
      This is modelled on CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM; a CONFIG_ symbol declares
      the existence of <asm/hash.h>.
      That file may define its own versions of various functions, and define
      HAVE_* symbols (no CONFIG_ prefix!) to suppress the generic ones.
      Included is a self-test (in lib/test_hash.c) that verifies the basics.
      It is NOT in general required that the arch-specific functions compute
      the same thing as the generic, but if a HAVE_* symbol is defined with
      the value 1, then equality is tested.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGeorge Spelvin <linux@sciencehorizons.net>
      Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
      Cc: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org>
      Cc: Andreas Schwab <schwab@linux-m68k.org>
      Cc: Philippe De Muyter <phdm@macq.eu>
      Cc: linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org
      Cc: Alistair Francis <alistai@xilinx.com>
      Cc: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com>
      Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
      Cc: uclinux-h8-devel@lists.sourceforge.jp
  22. 20 May, 2016 1 commit
  23. 15 Apr, 2016 1 commit
  24. 01 Apr, 2016 1 commit
  25. 25 Mar, 2016 1 commit
    • Alexander Potapenko's avatar
      mm, kasan: stackdepot implementation. Enable stackdepot for SLAB · cd11016e
      Alexander Potapenko authored
      Implement the stack depot and provide CONFIG_STACKDEPOT.  Stack depot
      will allow KASAN store allocation/deallocation stack traces for memory
      chunks.  The stack traces are stored in a hash table and referenced by
      handles which reside in the kasan_alloc_meta and kasan_free_meta
      structures in the allocated memory chunks.
      IRQ stack traces are cut below the IRQ entry point to avoid unnecessary
      Right now stackdepot support is only enabled in SLAB allocator.  Once
      KASAN features in SLAB are on par with those in SLUB we can switch SLUB
      to stackdepot as well, thus removing the dependency on SLUB stack
      bookkeeping, which wastes a lot of memory.
      This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: stack depots" patch originally
      prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov.
      Joonsoo has said that he plans to reuse the stackdepot code for the
      mm/page_owner.c debugging facility.
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/depot_stack_handle/depot_stack_handle_t]
      [aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: comment style fixes]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAlexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
      Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
      Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
      Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
      Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
      Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
      Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
      Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
  26. 22 Mar, 2016 1 commit
    • Dmitry Vyukov's avatar
      kernel: add kcov code coverage · 5c9a8750
      Dmitry Vyukov authored
      kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing
      (randomized testing).  Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique
      that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a
      system.  A notable user-space example is AFL
      (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/).  However, this technique is not
      widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel
      kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible.  It aims to
      collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs.
      To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard
      interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or
      non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g.  scheduler, locking).
      Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the
      API anticipates additional collection modes.  Initially I also
      implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash
      table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch).  I've
      dropped the second mode for simplicity.
      This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side.  The complimentary
      compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296.
      We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has
      found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months:
      We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller.
      Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly
      help is more traditional "blob mutation".  For example, mounting a
      random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire.
      Why not gcov.  Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset
      coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat.  A
      typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g.  an invalid
      input).  In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as
      reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic
      blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M).  Cost of
      kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges.  On top of
      that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always
      background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage.
      With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible.
      kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is
      insecure.  But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible.
      Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas.
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode']
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig]
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
      Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
      Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
      Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
      Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
      Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
      Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
      Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
      Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
      Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
      Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
      Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
      Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
      Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
  27. 02 Mar, 2016 1 commit
  28. 20 Feb, 2016 1 commit
  29. 21 Jan, 2016 3 commits
  30. 11 Dec, 2015 1 commit
  31. 01 Dec, 2015 1 commit
    • Nikolay Aleksandrov's avatar
      net: add support for netdev notifier error injection · 02fff96a
      Nikolay Aleksandrov authored
      This module allows to insert errors in some of netdevice's notifier
      events. All network drivers use these notifiers to signal various events
      and to check if they are allowed, e.g. PRECHANGEMTU and CHANGEMTU
      afterwards. Until recently I had to run failure tests by injecting
      a custom module, but now this infrastructure makes it trivial to test
      these failure paths. Some of the recent bugs I fixed were found using
      this module.
      Here's an example:
       $ cd /sys/kernel/debug/notifier-error-inject/netdev
       $ echo -22 > actions/NETDEV_CHANGEMTU/error
       $ ip link set eth0 mtu 1024
       RTNETLINK answers: Invalid argument
      CC: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>
      CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
      CC: netdev <netdev@vger.kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarNikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
  32. 07 Nov, 2015 1 commit
    • Rasmus Villemoes's avatar
      test_printf: test printf family at runtime · 707cc728
      Rasmus Villemoes authored
      This adds a simple module for testing the kernel's printf facilities.
      Previously, some %p extensions have caused a wrong return value in case
      the entire output didn't fit and/or been unusable in kasprintf().  This
      should help catch such issues.  Also, it should help ensure that changes
      to the formatting algorithms don't break anything.
      I'm not sure if we have a struct dentry or struct file lying around at
      boot time or if we can fake one, but most %p extensions should be
      testable, as should the ordinary number and string formatting.
      The nature of vararg functions means we can't use a more conventional
      table-driven approach.
      For now, this is mostly a skeleton; contributions are very
      welcome. Some tests are/will be slightly annoying to write, since the
      expected output depends on stuff like CONFIG_*, sizeof(long), runtime
      values etc.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarRasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Martin Kletzander <mkletzan@redhat.com>
      Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
  33. 08 Oct, 2015 1 commit
  34. 26 Aug, 2015 1 commit