1. 13 Dec, 2018 2 commits
  2. 20 Nov, 2018 4 commits
    • Eric Biggers's avatar
      crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support · 059c2a4d
      Eric Biggers authored
      Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode.  Adiantum was designed by
      Paul Crowley and is specified by our paper:
      
          Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors
          (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf)
      
      See our paper for full details; this patch only provides an overview.
      
      Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode designed for
      fast and secure disk encryption, especially on CPUs without dedicated
      crypto instructions.  Adiantum encrypts each sector using the XChaCha12
      stream cipher, two passes of an ε-almost-∆-universal (εA∆U) hash
      function, and an invocation of the AES-256 block cipher on a single
      16-byte block.  On CPUs without AES instructions, Adiantum is much
      faster than AES-XTS; for example, on ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte sectors
      Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption,
      and decryption about 5 times faster.
      
      Adiantum is a specialization of the more general HBSH construction.  Our
      earlier proposal, HPolyC, was also a HBSH specialization, but it used a
      different εA∆U hash function, one based on Poly1305 only.  Adiantum's
      εA∆U hash function, which is based primarily on the "NH" hash function
      like that used in UMAC (RFC4418), is about twice as fast as HPolyC's;
      consequently, Adiantum is about 20% faster than HPolyC.
      
      This speed comes with no loss of security: Adiantum is provably just as
      secure as HPolyC, in fact slightly *more* secure.  Like HPolyC,
      Adiantum's security is reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256,
      subject to a security bound.  XChaCha12 itself has a security reduction
      to ChaCha12.  Therefore, one need not "trust" Adiantum; one need only
      trust ChaCha12 and AES-256.  Note that the εA∆U hash function is only
      used for its proven combinatorical properties so cannot be "broken".
      
      Adiantum is also a true wide-block encryption mode, so flipping any
      plaintext bit in the sector scrambles the entire ciphertext, and vice
      versa.  No other such mode is available in the kernel currently; doing
      the same with XTS scrambles only 16 bytes.  Adiantum also supports
      arbitrary-length tweaks and naturally supports any length input >= 16
      bytes without needing "ciphertext stealing".
      
      For the stream cipher, Adiantum uses XChaCha12 rather than XChaCha20 in
      order to make encryption feasible on the widest range of devices.
      Although the 20-round variant is quite popular, the best known attacks
      on ChaCha are on only 7 rounds, so ChaCha12 still has a substantial
      security margin; in fact, larger than AES-256's.  12-round Salsa20 is
      also the eSTREAM recommendation.  For the block cipher, Adiantum uses
      AES-256, despite it having a lower security margin than XChaCha12 and
      needing table lookups, due to AES's extensive adoption and analysis
      making it the obvious first choice.  Nevertheless, for flexibility this
      patch also permits the "adiantum" template to be instantiated with
      XChaCha20 and/or with an alternate block cipher.
      
      We need Adiantum support in the kernel for use in dm-crypt and fscrypt,
      where currently the only other suitable options are block cipher modes
      such as AES-XTS.  A big problem with this is that many low-end mobile
      devices (e.g. Android Go phones sold primarily in developing countries,
      as well as some smartwatches) still have CPUs that lack AES
      instructions, e.g. ARM Cortex-A7.  Sadly, AES-XTS encryption is much too
      slow to be viable on these devices.  We did find that some "lightweight"
      block ciphers are fast enough, but these suffer from problems such as
      not having much cryptanalysis or being too controversial.
      
      The ChaCha stream cipher has excellent performance but is insecure to
      use directly for disk encryption, since each sector's IV is reused each
      time it is overwritten.  Even restricting the threat model to offline
      attacks only isn't enough, since modern flash storage devices don't
      guarantee that "overwrites" are really overwrites, due to wear-leveling.
      Adiantum avoids this problem by constructing a
      "tweakable super-pseudorandom permutation"; this is the strongest
      possible security model for length-preserving encryption.
      
      Of course, storing random nonces along with the ciphertext would be the
      ideal solution.  But doing that with existing hardware and filesystems
      runs into major practical problems; in most cases it would require data
      journaling (like dm-integrity) which severely degrades performance.
      Thus, for now length-preserving encryption is still needed.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      059c2a4d
    • Eric Biggers's avatar
      crypto: nhpoly1305 - add NHPoly1305 support · 26609a21
      Eric Biggers authored
      Add a generic implementation of NHPoly1305, an ε-almost-∆-universal hash
      function used in the Adiantum encryption mode.
      
      CONFIG_NHPOLY1305 is not selectable by itself since there won't be any
      real reason to enable it without also enabling Adiantum support.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      26609a21
    • Eric Biggers's avatar
      crypto: chacha - add XChaCha12 support · aa762409
      Eric Biggers authored
      Now that the generic implementation of ChaCha20 has been refactored to
      allow varying the number of rounds, add support for XChaCha12, which is
      the XSalsa construction applied to ChaCha12.  ChaCha12 is one of the
      three ciphers specified by the original ChaCha paper
      (https://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf: "ChaCha, a variant of
      Salsa20"), alongside ChaCha8 and ChaCha20.  ChaCha12 is faster than
      ChaCha20 but has a lower, but still large, security margin.
      
      We need XChaCha12 support so that it can be used in the Adiantum
      encryption mode, which enables disk/file encryption on low-end mobile
      devices where AES-XTS is too slow as the CPUs lack AES instructions.
      
      We'd prefer XChaCha20 (the more popular variant), but it's too slow on
      some of our target devices, so at least in some cases we do need the
      XChaCha12-based version.  In more detail, the problem is that Adiantum
      is still much slower than we're happy with, and encryption still has a
      quite noticeable effect on the feel of low-end devices.  Users and
      vendors push back hard against encryption that degrades the user
      experience, which always risks encryption being disabled entirely.  So
      we need to choose the fastest option that gives us a solid margin of
      security, and here that's XChaCha12.  The best known attack on ChaCha
      breaks only 7 rounds and has 2^235 time complexity, so ChaCha12's
      security margin is still better than AES-256's.  Much has been learned
      about cryptanalysis of ARX ciphers since Salsa20 was originally designed
      in 2005, and it now seems we can be comfortable with a smaller number of
      rounds.  The eSTREAM project also suggests the 12-round version of
      Salsa20 as providing the best balance among the different variants:
      combining very good performance with a "comfortable margin of security".
      
      Note that it would be trivial to add vanilla ChaCha12 in addition to
      XChaCha12.  However, it's unneeded for now and therefore is omitted.
      
      As discussed in the patch that introduced XChaCha20 support, I
      considered splitting the code into separate chacha-common, chacha20,
      xchacha20, and xchacha12 modules, so that these algorithms could be
      enabled/disabled independently.  However, since nearly all the code is
      shared anyway, I ultimately decided there would have been little benefit
      to the added complexity.
      Reviewed-by: default avatarArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
      Acked-by: default avatarMartin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      aa762409
    • Eric Biggers's avatar
      crypto: chacha20-generic - add XChaCha20 support · de61d7ae
      Eric Biggers authored
      Add support for the XChaCha20 stream cipher.  XChaCha20 is the
      application of the XSalsa20 construction
      (https://cr.yp.to/snuffle/xsalsa-20081128.pdf) to ChaCha20 rather than
      to Salsa20.  XChaCha20 extends ChaCha20's nonce length from 64 bits (or
      96 bits, depending on convention) to 192 bits, while provably retaining
      ChaCha20's security.  XChaCha20 uses the ChaCha20 permutation to map the
      key and first 128 nonce bits to a 256-bit subkey.  Then, it does the
      ChaCha20 stream cipher with the subkey and remaining 64 bits of nonce.
      
      We need XChaCha support in order to add support for the Adiantum
      encryption mode.  Note that to meet our performance requirements, we
      actually plan to primarily use the variant XChaCha12.  But we believe
      it's wise to first add XChaCha20 as a baseline with a higher security
      margin, in case there are any situations where it can be used.
      Supporting both variants is straightforward.
      
      Since XChaCha20's subkey differs for each request, XChaCha20 can't be a
      template that wraps ChaCha20; that would require re-keying the
      underlying ChaCha20 for every request, which wouldn't be thread-safe.
      Instead, we make XChaCha20 its own top-level algorithm which calls the
      ChaCha20 streaming implementation internally.
      
      Similar to the existing ChaCha20 implementation, we define the IV to be
      the nonce and stream position concatenated together.  This allows users
      to seek to any position in the stream.
      
      I considered splitting the code into separate chacha20-common, chacha20,
      and xchacha20 modules, so that chacha20 and xchacha20 could be
      enabled/disabled independently.  However, since nearly all the code is
      shared anyway, I ultimately decided there would have been little benefit
      to the added complexity of separate modules.
      Reviewed-by: default avatarArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
      Acked-by: default avatarMartin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      de61d7ae
  3. 16 Nov, 2018 1 commit
  4. 09 Nov, 2018 1 commit
  5. 28 Sep, 2018 2 commits
  6. 21 Sep, 2018 1 commit
  7. 04 Sep, 2018 1 commit
  8. 03 Aug, 2018 1 commit
  9. 20 Jul, 2018 1 commit
  10. 01 Jul, 2018 2 commits
    • Eric Biggers's avatar
      crypto: vmac - remove insecure version with hardcoded nonce · 0917b873
      Eric Biggers authored
      Remove the original version of the VMAC template that had the nonce
      hardcoded to 0 and produced a digest with the wrong endianness.  I'm
      unsure whether this had users or not (there are no explicit in-kernel
      references to it), but given that the hardcoded nonce made it wildly
      insecure unless a unique key was used for each message, let's try
      removing it and see if anyone complains.
      
      Leave the new "vmac64" template that requires the nonce to be explicitly
      specified as the first 16 bytes of data and uses the correct endianness
      for the digest.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      0917b873
    • Eric Biggers's avatar
      crypto: vmac - add nonced version with big endian digest · ed331ada
      Eric Biggers authored
      Currently the VMAC template uses a "nonce" hardcoded to 0, which makes
      it insecure unless a unique key is set for every message.  Also, the
      endianness of the final digest is wrong: the implementation uses little
      endian, but the VMAC specification has it as big endian, as do other
      VMAC implementations such as the one in Crypto++.
      
      Add a new VMAC template where the nonce is passed as the first 16 bytes
      of data (similar to what is done for Poly1305's nonce), and the digest
      is big endian.  Call it "vmac64", since the old name of simply "vmac"
      didn't clarify whether the implementation is of VMAC-64 or of VMAC-128
      (which produce 64-bit and 128-bit digests respectively); so we fix the
      naming ambiguity too.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      ed331ada
  11. 30 May, 2018 5 commits
    • Eric Biggers's avatar
      crypto: testmgr - eliminate redundant decryption test vectors · 92a4c9fe
      Eric Biggers authored
      Currently testmgr has separate encryption and decryption test vectors
      for symmetric ciphers.  That's massively redundant, since with few
      exceptions (mostly mistakes, apparently), all decryption tests are
      identical to the encryption tests, just with the input/result flipped.
      
      Therefore, eliminate the redundancy by removing the decryption test
      vectors and updating testmgr to test both encryption and decryption
      using what used to be the encryption test vectors.  Naming is adjusted
      accordingly: each cipher_testvec now has a 'ptext' (plaintext), 'ctext'
      (ciphertext), and 'len' instead of an 'input', 'result', 'ilen', and
      'rlen'.  Note that it was always the case that 'ilen == rlen'.
      
      AES keywrap ("kw(aes)") is special because its IV is generated by the
      encryption.  Previously this was handled by specifying 'iv_out' for
      encryption and 'iv' for decryption.  To make it work cleanly with only
      one set of test vectors, put the IV in 'iv', remove 'iv_out', and add a
      boolean that indicates that the IV is generated by the encryption.
      
      In total, this removes over 10000 lines from testmgr.h, with no
      reduction in test coverage since prior patches already copied the few
      unique decryption test vectors into the encryption test vectors.
      
      This covers all algorithms that used 'struct cipher_testvec', e.g. any
      block cipher in the ECB, CBC, CTR, XTS, LRW, CTS-CBC, PCBC, OFB, or
      keywrap modes, and Salsa20 and ChaCha20.  No change is made to AEAD
      tests, though we probably can eliminate a similar redundancy there too.
      
      The testmgr.h portion of this patch was automatically generated using
      the following awk script, with some slight manual fixups on top (updated
      'struct cipher_testvec' definition, updated a few comments, and fixed up
      the AES keywrap test vectors):
      
          BEGIN { OTHER = 0; ENCVEC = 1; DECVEC = 2; DECVEC_TAIL = 3; mode = OTHER }
      
          /^static const struct cipher_testvec.*_enc_/ { sub("_enc", ""); mode = ENCVEC }
          /^static const struct cipher_testvec.*_dec_/ { mode = DECVEC }
          mode == ENCVEC && !/\.ilen[[:space:]]*=/ {
          	sub(/\.input[[:space:]]*=$/,    ".ptext =")
          	sub(/\.input[[:space:]]*=/,     ".ptext\t=")
          	sub(/\.result[[:space:]]*=$/,   ".ctext =")
          	sub(/\.result[[:space:]]*=/,    ".ctext\t=")
          	sub(/\.rlen[[:space:]]*=/,      ".len\t=")
          	print
          }
          mode == DECVEC_TAIL && /[^[:space:]]/ { mode = OTHER }
          mode == OTHER                         { print }
          mode == ENCVEC && /^};/               { mode = OTHER }
          mode == DECVEC && /^};/               { mode = DECVEC_TAIL }
      
      Note that git's default diff algorithm gets confused by the testmgr.h
      portion of this patch, and reports too many lines added and removed.
      It's better viewed with 'git diff --minimal' (or 'git show --minimal'),
      which reports "2 files changed, 919 insertions(+), 11723 deletions(-)".
      Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      92a4c9fe
    • Eric Biggers's avatar
      crypto: testmgr - add extra kw(aes) encryption test vector · 4074a77d
      Eric Biggers authored
      One "kw(aes)" decryption test vector doesn't exactly match an encryption
      test vector with input and result swapped.  In preparation for removing
      the decryption test vectors, add this test vector to the encryption test
      vectors, so we don't lose any test coverage.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      4074a77d
    • Eric Biggers's avatar
      crypto: testmgr - add extra ecb(tnepres) encryption test vectors · a0e20b9b
      Eric Biggers authored
      None of the four "ecb(tnepres)" decryption test vectors exactly match an
      encryption test vector with input and result swapped.  In preparation
      for removing the decryption test vectors, add these to the encryption
      test vectors, so we don't lose any test coverage.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      a0e20b9b
    • Eric Biggers's avatar
      crypto: testmgr - make an cbc(des) encryption test vector chunked · 17880f11
      Eric Biggers authored
      One "cbc(des)" decryption test vector doesn't exactly match an
      encryption test vector with input and result swapped.  It's *almost* the
      same as one, but the decryption version is "chunked" while the
      encryption version is "unchunked".  In preparation for removing the
      decryption test vectors, make the encryption one both chunked and
      unchunked, so we don't lose any test coverage.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      17880f11
    • Eric Biggers's avatar
      crypto: testmgr - add extra ecb(des) encryption test vectors · 097012e8
      Eric Biggers authored
      Two "ecb(des)" decryption test vectors don't exactly match any of the
      encryption test vectors with input and result swapped.  In preparation
      for removing the decryption test vectors, add these to the encryption
      test vectors, so we don't lose any test coverage.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      097012e8
  12. 26 May, 2018 2 commits
  13. 18 May, 2018 2 commits
  14. 20 Apr, 2018 1 commit
    • Nick Terrell's avatar
      crypto: zstd - Add zstd support · d28fc3db
      Nick Terrell authored
      Adds zstd support to crypto and scompress. Only supports the default
      level.
      
      Previously we held off on this patch, since there weren't any users.
      Now zram is ready for zstd support, but depends on CONFIG_CRYPTO_ZSTD,
      which isn't defined until this patch is in. I also see a patch adding
      zstd to pstore [0], which depends on crypto zstd.
      
      [0] lkml.kernel.org/r/9c9416b2dff19f05fb4c35879aaa83d11ff72c92.1521626182.git.geliangtang@gmail.com
      Signed-off-by: default avatarNick Terrell <terrelln@fb.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      d28fc3db
  15. 16 Mar, 2018 2 commits
  16. 22 Feb, 2018 4 commits
    • Eric Biggers's avatar
      crypto: speck - add test vectors for Speck64-XTS · 41b3316e
      Eric Biggers authored
      Add test vectors for Speck64-XTS, generated in userspace using C code.
      The inputs were borrowed from the AES-XTS test vectors, with key lengths
      adjusted.
      
      xts-speck64-neon passes these tests.  However, they aren't currently
      applicable for the generic XTS template, as that only supports a 128-bit
      block size.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      41b3316e
    • Eric Biggers's avatar
      crypto: speck - add test vectors for Speck128-XTS · c3bb521b
      Eric Biggers authored
      Add test vectors for Speck128-XTS, generated in userspace using C code.
      The inputs were borrowed from the AES-XTS test vectors.
      
      Both xts(speck128-generic) and xts-speck128-neon pass these tests.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      c3bb521b
    • Eric Biggers's avatar
      crypto: speck - add support for the Speck block cipher · da7a0ab5
      Eric Biggers authored
      Add a generic implementation of Speck, including the Speck128 and
      Speck64 variants.  Speck is a lightweight block cipher that can be much
      faster than AES on processors that don't have AES instructions.
      
      We are planning to offer Speck-XTS (probably Speck128/256-XTS) as an
      option for dm-crypt and fscrypt on Android, for low-end mobile devices
      with older CPUs such as ARMv7 which don't have the Cryptography
      Extensions.  Currently, such devices are unencrypted because AES is not
      fast enough, even when the NEON bit-sliced implementation of AES is
      used.  Other AES alternatives such as Twofish, Threefish, Camellia,
      CAST6, and Serpent aren't fast enough either; it seems that only a
      modern ARX cipher can provide sufficient performance on these devices.
      
      This is a replacement for our original proposal
      (https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10101451/) which was to offer
      ChaCha20 for these devices.  However, the use of a stream cipher for
      disk/file encryption with no space to store nonces would have been much
      more insecure than we thought initially, given that it would be used on
      top of flash storage as well as potentially on top of F2FS, neither of
      which is guaranteed to overwrite data in-place.
      
      Speck has been somewhat controversial due to its origin.  Nevertheless,
      it has a straightforward design (it's an ARX cipher), and it appears to
      be the leading software-optimized lightweight block cipher currently,
      with the most cryptanalysis.  It's also easy to implement without side
      channels, unlike AES.  Moreover, we only intend Speck to be used when
      the status quo is no encryption, due to AES not being fast enough.
      
      We've also considered a novel length-preserving encryption mode based on
      ChaCha20 and Poly1305.  While theoretically attractive, such a mode
      would be a brand new crypto construction and would be more complicated
      and difficult to implement efficiently in comparison to Speck-XTS.
      
      There is confusion about the byte and word orders of Speck, since the
      original paper doesn't specify them.  But we have implemented it using
      the orders the authors recommended in a correspondence with them.  The
      test vectors are taken from the original paper but were mapped to byte
      arrays using the recommended byte and word orders.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      da7a0ab5
    • Conor McLoughlin's avatar
      crypto: testmgr - Fix incorrect values in PKCS#1 test vector · 333e18c5
      Conor McLoughlin authored
      The RSA private key for the first form should have
      version, prime1, prime2, exponent1, exponent2, coefficient
      values 0.
      With non-zero values for prime1,2, exponent 1,2 and coefficient
      the Intel QAT driver will assume that values are provided for the
      private key second form. This will result in signature verification
      failures for modules where QAT device is present and the modules
      are signed with rsa,sha256.
      
      Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGiovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarConor McLoughlin <conor.mcloughlin@intel.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarStephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      333e18c5
  17. 25 Jan, 2018 1 commit
  18. 22 Sep, 2017 1 commit
  19. 22 Aug, 2017 1 commit
  20. 20 Jun, 2017 1 commit
  21. 10 Jun, 2017 1 commit
  22. 24 Apr, 2017 1 commit
  23. 09 Mar, 2017 1 commit
  24. 01 Mar, 2017 1 commit
    • Laura Abbott's avatar
      crypto: testmgr - Pad aes_ccm_enc_tv_template vector · 1c68bb0f
      Laura Abbott authored
      Running with KASAN and crypto tests currently gives
      
       BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in __test_aead+0x9d9/0x2200 at addr ffffffff8212fca0
       Read of size 16 by task cryptomgr_test/1107
       Address belongs to variable 0xffffffff8212fca0
       CPU: 0 PID: 1107 Comm: cryptomgr_test Not tainted 4.10.0+ #45
       Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.9.1-1.fc24 04/01/2014
       Call Trace:
        dump_stack+0x63/0x8a
        kasan_report.part.1+0x4a7/0x4e0
        ? __test_aead+0x9d9/0x2200
        ? crypto_ccm_init_crypt+0x218/0x3c0 [ccm]
        kasan_report+0x20/0x30
        check_memory_region+0x13c/0x1a0
        memcpy+0x23/0x50
        __test_aead+0x9d9/0x2200
        ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50
        ? alg_test_akcipher+0xf0/0xf0
        ? crypto_skcipher_init_tfm+0x2e3/0x310
        ? crypto_spawn_tfm2+0x37/0x60
        ? crypto_ccm_init_tfm+0xa9/0xd0 [ccm]
        ? crypto_aead_init_tfm+0x7b/0x90
        ? crypto_alloc_tfm+0xc4/0x190
        test_aead+0x28/0xc0
        alg_test_aead+0x54/0xd0
        alg_test+0x1eb/0x3d0
        ? alg_find_test+0x90/0x90
        ? __sched_text_start+0x8/0x8
        ? __wake_up_common+0x70/0xb0
        cryptomgr_test+0x4d/0x60
        kthread+0x173/0x1c0
        ? crypto_acomp_scomp_free_ctx+0x60/0x60
        ? kthread_create_on_node+0xa0/0xa0
        ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x40
       Memory state around the buggy address:
        ffffffff8212fb80: 00 00 00 00 01 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00
        ffffffff8212fc00: 00 01 fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 01 fa fa fa
       >ffffffff8212fc80: fa fa fa fa 00 05 fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00
                                         ^
        ffffffff8212fd00: 01 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 01 fa fa fa
        ffffffff8212fd80: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 05 fa fa fa fa fa fa
      
      This always happens on the same IV which is less than 16 bytes.
      
      Per Ard,
      
      "CCM IVs are 16 bytes, but due to the way they are constructed
      internally, the final couple of bytes of input IV are dont-cares.
      
      Apparently, we do read all 16 bytes, which triggers the KASAN errors."
      
      Fix this by padding the IV with null bytes to be at least 16 bytes.
      
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Fixes: 0bc5a6c5 ("crypto: testmgr - Disable rfc4309 test and convert
      test vectors")
      Acked-by: default avatarArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLaura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      1c68bb0f