1. 05 Jun, 2018 1 commit
    • Greg Kroah-Hartman's avatar
      staging: lustre: delete the filesystem from the tree. · be65f9ed
      Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
      The Lustre filesystem has been in the kernel tree for over 5 years now.
      While it has been an endless source of enjoyment for new kernel
      developers learning how to do basic codingstyle cleanups, as well as an
      semi-entertaining source of bewilderment from the vfs developers any
      time they have looked into the codebase to try to figure out how to port
      their latest api changes to this filesystem, it has not really moved
      forward into the "this is in shape to get out of staging" despite many
      half-completed attempts.
      And getting code out of staging is the main goal of that portion of the
      kernel tree.  Code should not stagnate and it feels like having this
      code in staging is only causing the development cycle of the filesystem
      to take longer than it should.  There is a whole separate out-of-tree
      copy of this codebase where the developers work on it, and then random
      changes are thrown over the wall at staging at some later point in time.
      This dual-tree development model has never worked, and the state of this
      codebase is proof of that.
      So, let's just delete the whole mess.  Now the lustre developers can go
      off and work in their out-of-tree codebase and not have to worry about
      providing valid changelog entries and breaking their patches up into
      logical pieces.  They can take the time they have spend doing those
      types of housekeeping chores and get the codebase into a much better
      shape, and it can be submitted for inclusion into the real part of the
      kernel tree when ready.
      Cc: Oleg Drokin <oleg.drokin@intel.com>
      Cc: Andreas Dilger <andreas.dilger@intel.com>
      Cc: James Simmons <jsimmons@infradead.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
  2. 16 Nov, 2017 1 commit
  3. 02 Nov, 2017 1 commit
    • Greg Kroah-Hartman's avatar
      License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license · b2441318
      Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
      Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
      makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
      By default all files without license information are under the default
      license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
      Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
      SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
      shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
      This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
      Philippe Ombredanne.
      How this work was done:
      Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
      the use cases:
       - file had no licensing information it it.
       - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
       - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
      Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
      where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
      had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
      The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
      a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
      output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
      tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
      base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
      The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
      assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
      results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
      to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
      immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
      Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
       - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
       - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
         lines of source
       - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
      All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
      The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
      identifiers to apply.
       - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
         considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
         COPYING file license applied.
         For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
         SPDX license identifier                            # files
         GPL-2.0                                              11139
         and resulted in the first patch in this series.
         If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
         Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:
         SPDX license identifier                            # files
         GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930
         and resulted in the second patch in this series.
       - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
         of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
         any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
         it (per prior point).  Results summary:
         SPDX license identifier                            # files
         GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
         GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
         ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
         ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
         LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
         GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
         ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
         LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
         LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
         ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
         ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1
         and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
       - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
         the concluded license(s).
       - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
         license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
         licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
       - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
         resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
         which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
       - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
         confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
       - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
         the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
         in time.
      In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
      spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
      source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
      by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
      Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
      FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
      disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
      Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
      they are related.
      Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
      for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
      files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
      in about 15000 files.
      In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
      copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
      correct identifier.
      Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
      inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
      version early this week with:
       - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
         license ids and scores
       - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
         files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
       - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
         was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
         SPDX license was correct
      This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
      worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
      different types of files to be modified.
      These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
      parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
      format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
      based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
      distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
      comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
      generate the patches.
      Reviewed-by: default avatarKate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarPhilippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
  4. 31 Jul, 2017 1 commit
  5. 18 May, 2017 1 commit
  6. 10 Mar, 2017 1 commit
    • Nicolas Iooss's avatar
      selinux: include sys/socket.h in host programs to have PF_MAX · c017c71c
      Nicolas Iooss authored
      Compiling with clang and -Wundef makes the compiler report a usage of
      undefined PF_MAX macro in security/selinux/include/classmap.h:
          In file included from scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c:48:
          security/selinux/include/classmap.h:37:31: warning: no previous
          extern declaration for non-static variable 'secclass_map'
          struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
          security/selinux/include/classmap.h:235:5: error: 'PF_MAX' is not
          defined, evaluates to 0 [-Werror,-Wundef]
          #if PF_MAX > 43
          In file included from scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c:17:
          security/selinux/include/classmap.h:37:31: warning: no previous
          extern declaration for non-static variable 'secclass_map'
          struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
          security/selinux/include/classmap.h:235:5: error: 'PF_MAX' is not
          defined, evaluates to 0 [-Werror,-Wundef]
          #if PF_MAX > 43
      PF_MAX is defined in include/linux/socket.h but not in
      include/uapi/linux/socket.h. Therefore host programs have to rely on the
      definition from libc's /usr/include/bits/socket.h, included by
      Fix the issue by using sys/socket.h in mdp and genheaders. When
      classmap.h is included by security/selinux/avc.c, it uses the kernel
      definition of PF_MAX, which makes the test consistent.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarNicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@m4x.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
  7. 21 Dec, 2016 1 commit
    • Paul Moore's avatar
      selinux: use the kernel headers when building scripts/selinux · bfc5e3a6
      Paul Moore authored
      Commit 3322d0d6 ("selinux: keep SELinux in sync with new capability
      definitions") added a check on the defined capabilities without
      explicitly including the capability header file which caused problems
      when building genheaders for users of clang/llvm.  Resolve this by
      using the kernel headers when building genheaders, which is arguably
      the right thing to do regardless, and explicitly including the
      kernel's capability.h header file in classmap.h.  We also update the
      mdp build, even though it wasn't causing an error we really should
      be using the headers from the kernel we are building.
      Reported-by: default avatarNicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@m4x.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
  8. 13 Jul, 2015 1 commit
  9. 20 Aug, 2014 1 commit
  10. 17 Jun, 2014 1 commit
  11. 09 Jun, 2014 1 commit
  12. 19 May, 2011 1 commit
    • Randy Dunlap's avatar
      Create Documentation/security/, · d410fa4e
      Randy Dunlap authored
      move LSM-, credentials-, and keys-related files from Documentation/
        to Documentation/security/,
      add Documentation/security/00-INDEX, and
      update all occurrences of Documentation/<moved_file>
        to Documentation/security/<moved_file>.
  13. 03 Mar, 2011 1 commit
  14. 15 Mar, 2010 1 commit
  15. 22 Nov, 2009 1 commit
  16. 18 Nov, 2009 1 commit
  17. 24 Oct, 2009 1 commit
  18. 07 Oct, 2009 2 commits
    • Stephen Smalley's avatar
      selinux: generate flask headers during kernel build · 8753f6be
      Stephen Smalley authored
      Add a simple utility (scripts/selinux/genheaders) and invoke it to
      generate the kernel-private class and permission indices in flask.h
      and av_permissions.h automatically during the kernel build from the
      security class mapping definitions in classmap.h.  Adding new kernel
      classes and permissions can then be done just by adding them to classmap.h.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
    • Stephen Smalley's avatar
      selinux: dynamic class/perm discovery · c6d3aaa4
      Stephen Smalley authored
      Modify SELinux to dynamically discover class and permission values
      upon policy load, based on the dynamic object class/perm discovery
      logic from libselinux.  A mapping is created between kernel-private
      class and permission indices used outside the security server and the
      policy values used within the security server.
      The mappings are only applied upon kernel-internal computations;
      similar mappings for the private indices of userspace object managers
      is handled on a per-object manager basis by the userspace AVC.  The
      interfaces for compute_av and transition_sid are split for kernel
      vs. userspace; the userspace functions are distinguished by a _user
      The kernel-private class indices are no longer tied to the policy
      values and thus do not need to skip indices for userspace classes;
      thus the kernel class index values are compressed.  The flask.h
      definitions were regenerated by deleting the userspace classes from
      refpolicy's definitions and then regenerating the headers.  Going
      forward, we can just maintain the flask.h, av_permissions.h, and
      classmap.h definitions separately from policy as they are no longer
      tied to the policy values.  The next patch introduces a utility to
      automate generation of flask.h and av_permissions.h from the
      classmap.h definitions.
      The older kernel class and permission string tables are removed and
      replaced by a single security class mapping table that is walked at
      policy load to generate the mapping.  The old kernel class validation
      logic is completely replaced by the mapping logic.
      The handle unknown logic is reworked.  reject_unknown=1 is handled
      when the mappings are computed at policy load time, similar to the old
      handling by the class validation logic.  allow_unknown=1 is handled
      when computing and mapping decisions - if the permission was not able
      to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then it is
      automatically added to the allowed vector.  If the class was not able
      to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then all permissions
      are allowed for it if allow_unknown=1.
      avc_audit leverages the new security class mapping table to lookup the
      class and permission names from the kernel-private indices.
      The mdp program is updated to use the new table when generating the
      class definitions and allow rules for a minimal boot policy for the
      kernel.  It should be noted that this policy will not include any
      userspace classes, nor will its policy index values for the kernel
      classes correspond with the ones in refpolicy (they will instead match
      the kernel-private indices).
      Signed-off-by: default avatarStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
  19. 23 Sep, 2009 1 commit
  20. 05 Sep, 2008 1 commit
  21. 26 Aug, 2008 1 commit
    • Serge E. Hallyn's avatar
      selinux: add support for installing a dummy policy (v2) · 93c06cbb
      Serge E. Hallyn authored
      In August 2006 I posted a patch generating a minimal SELinux policy.  This
      week, David P. Quigley posted an updated version of that as a patch against
      the kernel.  It also had nice logic for auto-installing the policy.
      Following is David's original patch intro (preserved especially
      bc it has stats on the generated policies):
      se interested in the changes there were only two significant
      changes. The first is that the iteration through the list of classes
      used NULL as a sentinel value. The problem with this is that the
      class_to_string array actually has NULL entries in its table as place
      holders for the user space object classes.
      The second change was that it would seem at some point the initial sids
      table was NULL terminated. This is no longer the case so that iteration
      has to be done on array length instead of looking for NULL.
      Some statistics on the policy that it generates:
      The policy consists of 523 lines which contain no blank lines. Of those
      523 lines 453 of them are class, permission, and initial sid
      definitions. These lines are usually little to no concern to the policy
      developer since they will not be adding object classes or permissions.
      Of the remaining 70 lines there is one type, one role, and one user
      statement. The remaining lines are broken into three portions. The first
      group are TE allow rules which make up 29 of the remaining lines, the
      second is assignment of labels to the initial sids which consist of 27
      lines, and file system labeling statements which are the remaining 11.
      In addition to the policy.conf generated there is a single file_contexts
      file containing two lines which labels the entire system with base_t.
      This policy generates a policy.23 binary that is 7920 bytes.
      (then a few versions later...):
      The new policy is 587 lines (stripped of blank lines) with 476 of those
      lines being the boilerplate that I mentioned last time. The remaining
      111 lines have the 3 lines for type, user, and role, 70 lines for the
      allow rules (one for each object class including user space object
      classes), 27 lines to assign types to the initial sids, and 11 lines for
      file system labeling. The policy binary is 9194 bytes.
      	Aug 26: Added Documentation/SELinux.txt
      	Aug 26: Incorporated a set of comments by Stephen Smalley:
      		1. auto-setup SELINUXTYPE=dummy
      		2. don't auto-install if selinux is enabled with
      			non-dummy policy
      		3. don't re-compute policy version
      		4. /sbin/setfiles not /usr/sbin/setfiles
      	Aug 22: As per JMorris comments, made sure make distclean
      		cleans up the mdp directory.
      		Removed a check for file_contexts which is now
      		created in the same file as the check, making it
      Signed-off-by: default avatarSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>