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  1. May 14, 2014
    • Heiko Carstens's avatar
      net: filter: s390: fix JIT address randomization · e84d2f8d
      Heiko Carstens authored
      
      This is the s390 variant of Alexei's JIT bug fix.
      (patch description below stolen from Alexei's patch)
      
      bpf_alloc_binary() adds 128 bytes of room to JITed program image
      and rounds it up to the nearest page size. If image size is close
      to page size (like 4000), it is rounded to two pages:
      round_up(4000 + 4 + 128) == 8192
      then 'hole' is computed as 8192 - (4000 + 4) = 4188
      If prandom_u32() % hole selects a number >= PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(*header)
      then kernel will crash during bpf_jit_free():
      
      kernel BUG at arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c:887!
      Call Trace:
       [<ffffffff81037285>] change_page_attr_set_clr+0x135/0x460
       [<ffffffff81694cc0>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x30/0x50
       [<ffffffff810378ff>] set_memory_rw+0x2f/0x40
       [<ffffffffa01a0d8d>] bpf_jit_free_deferred+0x2d/0x60
       [<ffffffff8106bf98>] process_one_work+0x1d8/0x6a0
       [<ffffffff8106bf38>] ? process_one_work+0x178/0x6a0
       [<ffffffff8106c90c>] worker_thread+0x11c/0x370
      
      since bpf_jit_free() does:
        unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)fp->bpf_func & PAGE_MASK;
        struct bpf_binary_header *header = (void *)addr;
      to compute start address of 'bpf_binary_header'
      and header->pages will pass junk to:
        set_memory_rw(addr, header->pages);
      
      Fix it by making sure that &header->image[prandom_u32() % hole] and &header
      are in the same page.
      
      Fixes: aa2d2c73 ("s390/bpf,jit: address randomize and write protect jit code")
      
      Reported-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
      Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.11+
      Signed-off-by: default avatarHeiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      e84d2f8d
  2. May 13, 2014
    • Alexei Starovoitov's avatar
      net: filter: x86: fix JIT address randomization · 773cd38f
      Alexei Starovoitov authored
      
      bpf_alloc_binary() adds 128 bytes of room to JITed program image
      and rounds it up to the nearest page size. If image size is close
      to page size (like 4000), it is rounded to two pages:
      round_up(4000 + 4 + 128) == 8192
      then 'hole' is computed as 8192 - (4000 + 4) = 4188
      If prandom_u32() % hole selects a number >= PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(*header)
      then kernel will crash during bpf_jit_free():
      
      kernel BUG at arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c:887!
      Call Trace:
       [<ffffffff81037285>] change_page_attr_set_clr+0x135/0x460
       [<ffffffff81694cc0>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x30/0x50
       [<ffffffff810378ff>] set_memory_rw+0x2f/0x40
       [<ffffffffa01a0d8d>] bpf_jit_free_deferred+0x2d/0x60
       [<ffffffff8106bf98>] process_one_work+0x1d8/0x6a0
       [<ffffffff8106bf38>] ? process_one_work+0x178/0x6a0
       [<ffffffff8106c90c>] worker_thread+0x11c/0x370
      
      since bpf_jit_free() does:
        unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)fp->bpf_func & PAGE_MASK;
        struct bpf_binary_header *header = (void *)addr;
      to compute start address of 'bpf_binary_header'
      and header->pages will pass junk to:
        set_memory_rw(addr, header->pages);
      
      Fix it by making sure that &header->image[prandom_u32() % hole] and &header
      are in the same page
      
      Fixes: 314beb9b ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      773cd38f
  3. May 05, 2014
  4. May 03, 2014
  5. May 01, 2014
  6. Apr 30, 2014
    • Vineet Gupta's avatar
      ARC: !PREEMPT: Ensure Return to kernel mode is IRQ safe · 8aa9e85a
      Vineet Gupta authored
      
      There was a very small race window where resume to kernel mode from a
      Exception Path (or pure kernel mode which is true for most of ARC
      exceptions anyways), was not disabling interrupts in restore_regs,
      clobbering the exception regs
      
      Anton found the culprit call flow (after many sleepless nights)
      
      | 1. we got a Trap from user land
      | 2. started to service it.
      | 3. While doing some stuff on user-land memory (I think it is padzero()),
      |     we got a DataTlbMiss
      | 4. On return from it we are taking "resume_kernel_mode" path
      | 5. NEED_RESHED is not set, so we go to "return from exception" path in
      |     restore regs.
      | 6. there seems to be IRQ happening
      
      Signed-off-by: default avatarVineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
      Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>   #3.10, 3.12, 3.13, 3.14
      Cc: Anton Kolesov <Anton.Kolesov@synopsys.com>
      Cc: Francois Bedard <Francois.Bedard@synopsys.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      8aa9e85a
  7. Apr 28, 2014
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